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Abstract 
 
 
A survey of post-1989 Romania is to indicate that while looking forward and striving for 
democratic achievements, the country also had to look backward and “come to terms” with her 
non-democratic recent past. Unfortunately, for more than 15 years after the collapse of 
communism no firm resolution has been brought to any of these pasts. The present paper is an 
overview of the politics of memory and its impact on the process of democratization in the case of 
Romania from 1989 to 2004. In this sense it focuses mainly, but not exclusively, on the way 
Romanian society dealt with history, memory, and amnesia when it came to Ion Antonescu and 
the Romanian Holocaust. 
Keywords: post-communism, Ion Antonescu, memory, Holocaust, democratization.  
 
 
A survey of post-1989 Romania may reveal that while looking forward 
and striving for democratic achievements, the country also had to look 
backward and “come to terms” with her non-democratic recent past. In these 
respect, the fascist years epitomized by the Iron Guard, the Antonescu war-
period, and the communist epoch, are the three more important episodes. 
However, one might add here the national-communist, distinct, Ceauşescu 
period, nevertheless the last decade with its suspicious, stage-managed, bloody 
revolution, and violent miners’ marches to Bucharest.  
Unfortunately, for more than 15 years after the collapse of communism 
no firm resolution has been brought to any of these pasts. A lack of political and 
prosecutorial will, together with a visible shortage of funds, and backed by an 
increasingly acute dispute among “memorians,” historians, and politicians 
representing different camps, only managed to urge things to a deadlock.  
Romania is not a singular case from this perspective, though many 
Romanians leave with this impression and frustrations generating complex. It is 
not even different. It is the same, only worst. Others in the East, where, as 
Leszek Kolakowski suggested, the Historikerstreit just began, and sometimes 
even in the West, have similar problems when it comes to critically scrutinize 
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their “unusable past” and memory. What might suggest a Romanian 
“exceptionalism” on this particular matter is the incapacity to initiate a serious 
and inevitable debate over regrettable performances. Most woeful, this 
prolonged situation prevented the society discovering what might be worth 
recovering from the past, and used in the present, and future.  
Immediately after 1989, East Europeans politicians and journalists often 
translated totalitarianism restrictively in terms of communism and limited their 
studies and practice of remembrance to the latest. Often, they simply preferred 
to ignore the other “face of Janus.”1 What really mattered for the Easterners was 
how to operate with the recent past as to present themselves as victims of the 
Soviet and communist oppression, a tyranny to whom they opposed, and 
resisted, as democrats or at least as anti-communists. Confident in the 
credibility of this “culture of victimization” they did not imagine that several 
episodes, symbols, and charismatic figures from the pre-communist past might 
thwart the newly proposed historical narrative, and hinder the crafting of a new 
national identity. The absence for several decades of any rigorous practices of 
remembering and democratic evaluation of the pre-war and war period made 
them hardly realize the “nightmare memory” of what they regarded as the 
“Golden Age” of their history. 
For the Romanians, as well as for all Easterners, 1989 was supposed to 
represent what 1945 represented for the Westerners, the “zero year”.2 Many 
believed that once the moral and legal problems of communism will be solved, 
and several syndromes of that period erased, the society, purged of sins, and 
with its national pride retrieved, will be able to look forward. Others thought 
that it would be even better if people would completely disregard the Past and 
look exclusively in the future.3 Lastly, some stressed the necessity of a return to 
1945, perceived in the East as the “zero year” in the Soviet, unsatisfactory 
variant, and suggested that the politics of retribution orchestrated by Moscow 
and the local communists after the war have to be reconsidered.4 Though for 
different reasons and from different perspectives, they underlined the fact that 
                                                          
1
  See A. James Gregor, The Two Faces of Janus: Marxism and Fascism in the Twentieth 
Century, Yale, Yale University Press, 2000.  
2
  Istvan Deak, “Introduction,” in Istvan Deak, Jan Gross, Tony Judt (eds.), The Politics of 
Retribution in Europe: World War Two and its Aftermath, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
2000, pp. 5-7. 
3
  Vladimir Tismăneanu, Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy: Nationalism, and Myth in 
Post-Communist Europe, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998, p. 144. For politicians, 
oblivion is more advantageous than remembering. Adrian Năstase, nowadays Romania Prime 
Minister, stressed the idea in 1995, and so did Mircea Geoană, minister of foreign affairs, in 2001. 
While referring mainly to the communist period, the two might have had in mind the example of 
1980s Spain, the way a weak civil society unprepared to confront trauma opted for consensus in 
order to avoid polarization and thus, foster democracy.  
4
  See Istvan Deak, Op. cit., p. 11. 
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unlike the West, the East, including Romania, bears the burden of several pasts, 
and have to transgress as many boundaries of memory.  
After 1989 the Romanians initiated, the debate over the communist past 
although barely sketched if compared with the evolution of the same problem in 
other former socialist countries. Unprepared, psychically and methodologically, 
and in many cases unwilling to cope with it, they were nonetheless to discover 
that the Others are also interested on a similar debate regarding Romania’s pre-
communist past. The issue of Holocaust and Romania’s participation in it was 
regarded with suspicion, and generated bitter reactions. In fact, it was the most 
neuralgic point from this perspective, and the only one that made the real 
interest of the Westerners, who, in many cases, were also unprepared to leave a 
well established canon, and accept a larger frame for a comparative discussion 
on both the Holocaust and the Gulag5. Few Romanians accepted it as a crucial 
test of moral strength, and first step in the participation to European memory.6 
Even fewer expressed their option for an equal treatment of the two forms of 
totalitarianism and their crimes, and plead for nuances, empathy, and sensibility, 
at the same time rejecting sophistry and conspiracy grounded mythologies.7 
Many were still trapped in the pre-1989 anti-fascist obsessive paradigm and 
“Organized Forgetting,” and “victims” of its pedagogical historiography and 
history obsessed pedagogy, which never encouraged studies on fascism, anti-
Semitism or the Holocaust.8 They also did not realized, and could not accept 
that despite the tremendous impact of the 1989 revolutions, and the collapse of 
the communist regimes in the East, the West was in the 1980s and 1990s 
primarily interested in the fiftieth series of commemorations relating Nazism, 
World War II, and the Holocaust. When they finally realized that a memory 
slalom is no longer possible, they often came to operate with a particular 
“hierarchy of urgencies” that frequently led to the trivialization of Holocaust, 
nonetheless to deflective and selective negationism.9  
However, the way the intellectual debate over the memory of Nazism and 
communism evolved in the West, and in the East, is more or less relevant when 
it comes to analyze the way Eastern societies implemented the “de-
communization” process, opened the files of the secret police, and so on. In 
                                                          
5
  See Martin Malia, “Forward: The Uses of Atrocity,” in Stéphane Courtois et al., The Black 
Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 
1999, pp. ix-xx. 
6  Dan Pavel, “Banalizarea Răului în Istorie” [The Banality of Evil in History], Sfera 
Politicii, no.60, May, 1998. 
7  Vladimir Tismăneanu, “Sunt fascismul şi comunismul fraţi siamezi?” [Are fascism and 
communism Siamese brothers?], Cuvântul, 5 (253), May, 1998.  
8
  
See Dinu C. Giurescu, România în al Doilea Război Mondial (1939-1945) [Romania in 
World War II], Bucharest, All, 1999, p. 152.
  
9
  
See Michael Shafir, “Selective Negationism of the Holocaust in East-Central Europe. The 
Case of Romania”,
 
RFE/RL East European Perspectives, 4, 25, 18 December, 2002.
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many cases it represented nothing but a “Red herring.” Those who really 
wanted to do it were not restrained in their enterprise. On the contrary, the West 
even encouraged them, at least politically if not intellectually. The others only 
pleaded and mimed their wish and will to break with the totalitarian communist 
past, its practices and “habits of the heart.” It is therefore no wonder that exactly 
the post-communist societies in which the triumph of democracy is still 
uncertain are the ones that still refuse to debate communism beyond the episode 
of the “Soviet tanks” and “collaborationist ethnic minorities” and that precisely 
those who could face communism only with difficulty decided to marginalize 
the pre-communist past, to let his extra-memory wait. Moreover, the same 
societies much to easily accepted the sudden return to the anti-democratic, and 
not only anti-communist, symbols of a romanced, re-invented and politically 
instrumentalized pre-communist past.10 
It is hard to clame that the Romanian political and intellectual elite is 
indifferent to the Past. In fact, after 1989, in the East, in no other former 
communist country the elites turned to the recent past in their search for models 
and legitimacy. Not only historical figures and cultural personalities but also 
political leaders and parties were brought back on stage. In this context, a 
“shortage of memory,” also experienced by the West in the case of both Nazism 
after 1945, and communism, not their memory, after 1989, nonetheless the fact 
that the “past is not yet another island” in the East, was but to ease the sudden 
and indiscriminately return to an often-controversial past.  
Post-communists Romania experienced a deep fragmentation of memory, 
which was a direct consequence of the institutional fragmentation and society 
polarization. If one takes into consideration the previous monopoly of the 
totalitarian state over history and memory, one might even welcome the 
process.11 The problem is that a group – not unique and not necessarily the most 
representative - of extremely visible and noisy party activists and ethno-vulgata 
historians, rapidly recycled into extreme anti-communists, managed from the 
very beginning to draw the attention and support of a significant segment of the 
population on the basis of an easily digestible, xenophobic, ultra-nationalist 
pseudo-memory whom in general lines they articulated under Ceauşescu. It 
would be unfair to say that the democrats made no effort to resist the new 
ultranationalist canon, demystify history, oppose the traditional-heroic valuation 
of the past, and any other form of history manipulation.12 Unfortunately, trapped 
into the logic of a permanent demystification, they ended up as helpless 
                                                          
10
  
Vladimir TismăneanuI, Fantasies of Salvation, pp. 13-16.
 
11
  Alexandru Zub, “Discursul istoric sub impactul schimbărilor” [Change and Historical 
Discourse], Sfera Politicii, 39, June, 1996.
 
12
  Adrian Cioroianu, “Mit şi Istorie, memorie şi uitare” [Myth and History, Memory and 
Oblivion], Sfera Politicii, 91-92, June, 2001, pp. 20-25. 
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prisoners of an extremely negative historiosophy.13 Thus, what they could offer 
as an alternative was a history based on self-stigma, a Cioran-type perspective 
on Romania’s history that many Romanians neither wanted nor needed.  
The year following the collapse of the communist regime, the extremist 
“Greater Romania Party” the ultra-nationalist “Romanian National Unity 
Party,” and “The Romanian Hearth” organization, aroused from the political 
and ideological vacuum created by the revolution. Striving for popularity and 
votes, for a place on the new, widely opened Romanian political stage, those 
political forces precipitated in an innocent and nonchalant way in salvaging, 
confiscating, and than instrumentalizing for political reasons exactly the most 
contested and disputable episodes and figures from Romania’s pre-communist 
history. The absence of any political and ideological restriction, and the media 
boom, was but to allow this group of cynical activists and members of the 
defunct Securitate (secret police) to be more “imaginative” and mobile. In other 
words, to exploit and irrigate the deepest fears and frustrations of the moment, 
and launch violent attacks against “all the enemies of the Romanian nation,” 
while slightly adjusting their previous rhetoric to the new context.14  
Among many other deeds, this group of political and intellectual 
charlatans successfully managed from the very beginning to haze the barely 
initiated discussion about memory and Vergagenheitsbewältingung. The manner 
in which they retrieved in the early 1990s the figure of Marshal Ion Antonescu, 
exploited his myth, initiated his cult, contested the decision of the 1946 
communist law-court who condemned Antonescu for war crimes, and 
demanded the rehabilitation of the “anti-Soviet war hero,” represents only one 
of the dreadful, nonetheless successful and popular, initiatives of this group.  
Several scholars suggested that the problems faced by post-communist 
Romania have less to do with the interwar period, and more with the legacy of 
the communist and national-communists epoch. That not so much interwar 
nationalism but several symbols and key figures, confiscated, distorted, and 
instrumentalized under Ceauşescu by his sycophants and hagiographers, who 
invented the tradition of a monolithic ethnocratic state,15 are still to inflect the 
mentality of some of the Romanians.16 Some took the above consideration as a 
                                                          
13
  Alexandru Zub and Sorin Antohi, Oglinzi retrovizoare. Istorie, memorie şi morală în România 
[Rearvision Mirrors. History, Memory and Morality in Romania], Iaşi, Polirom, 2002, pp. 94-95.  
14
  Vladimir Tismăneanu, “Epilogue-Fears, Phobias, Frustrations. Eastern Europe between 
Ethnocracy and Democracy”, in Reinventing Politics. Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel, New 
York, The Free Press, 1993.
  
15
  Ceauşescu’s regime, a mixture of nationalism and Stalinism, is often defined as a right 
wing, even quasi-fascist regime. See Henry E. Carey, “Post-communist Right Radicalism in 
Romania”, in Peter H. Merkl and Leonard Weinberg eds., The Revival of Right Wing Extremism 
in the Nineties, London, Frank Cass, 1997, p. 149.
 
16
  See Lucian Boia, “Riscul izolaţionismului” [The Risk of isolationism], Sfera Politicii, 39, 
June, 1996, p. 15. 
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“kernel of truth.” Others did not, and continued to return to the grass roots of 
the “incalculable visitants” from the past. For them, the communist period 
represented only a huge refrigerator that made possible the survival of interwar 
nationalism without affecting it.17 Lastly, few political scientists took into 
consideration both the “radical continuity” and the “radical return,” the more 
socially influential national-communist trend and the traditional one, and 
stressed the sheared elements and features of the two including Antonescu’s 
cult, xenophobia, the denial of Holocaust, and so on.18 
A symbol of Romania’s dictatorial and xenophobic pre-communist past, 
and a war criminal for the democrats, Antonescu, the central historical figure of 
a complex and multi-facet nationalist and anti-communist mythology, was 
exonerated after 1989 by his apologists who, after a leap into “a heroic past” 
with its violent solutions, wanted to present and propose him as a model for the 
future, and convince the Romanians to “live under his shadow.”  
Publicly not that prominent before 1989, at least not before 1975 when 
the novel “Delirul” (The Delirium) by Marin Preda was published for the first 
time, rather denounced, and sentenced, as a “fascist dictator” and “traitor” by 
the official anti-fascist discourse,19 Antonescu became a popular historical 
figure in the 1990s. A public opinion pool from May 1995, made by IRSOP, 
indicates that 62% of the interviewed Romanians continued to express their 
admiration for the Marshal. Hard to say for what exactly they were to “pray” 
him at the time, and how they perceived him, as long as, according to the same 
pool, only 2% of them expressed their admiration for Hitler, and only 13% 
candidly exhibited their xenophobia. However, what the results of the pool 
reveals are the side effects of the successful, biased propaganda of the pro-
Antonescu camp on one hand, and of the mal-concerted public debate on the 
Antonescu period on the other hand.  
In 1990 it was possible and to a certain degree acceptable to find an 
excuse, and explain the pro-Antonescu attitude saying that, due to the 
communist period, the Romanians did not knew much about their past. In 2002 
it was still possible, though unacceptable. No matter the attitude and arguments, 
any attempt to rehabilitate Antonescu and his regime was to indicate, at least, 
that the xenophobic, anti-Semitic, nationalist, dictatorial and quasi-fascist, 
eliminationist Past was not annoying them.  
Hard to say that this “awkward Past” ever represented a firm option for 
the future for most of the Romanians and that, as a consequence, post-
communist Romania, with its “outburst of ethnic nationalism” and “hampered 
                                                          
17
  Bernard Pacteau, “Congelatorul ideilor false” [The refrigerator of the false ideas], Revista 22, 
36, 7-13 September, 1994.  
18
  See Michael Shafir, “Romanian Extreme Right in the Post-Communist Period”, Sfera Politicii, 
March 1994, p. 4.
 
19
  Dinu C. Giurescu, România în al Doilea Război Mondial (1939-1945), pp. 70-71.
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democratization” was to fail “outside History” once more.20 Unfortunately, from 
outside Romania, meaning USA, Israel, and Western Europe that was, till 
recently, the general impression left by the slow, painful evolution of the 
country from 1989 up to 2004.21 Often, this impression was if not created than 
strengthened by Romania’s “unwilling politicians” and “undecided intellectuals” 
who were perceived from outside, and described from within, indiscriminately, 
as a monolithic group caught up in a common anti-liberal project including, 
among other things, the recovery and commemoration of Romania’s “fascist 
past.” Consequently, Antonescu’s apologists and the “champions” of Iron Guard, 
and outstanding intellectuals who insisted on the urgency of a prioritized in their 
view critical exam of the communist traumatic past as more representative for 
the deep moral crisis faced by post-communist Romania were often placed 
under the same stigmatizing “banner.” The fact that some represented the state 
and its institutions, and the others different forms of agglutination and 
institutionalization of an emerging civil society, political parties, or marginal 
groups striving for reinsertion in society contributed to an increased confusion 
and uphold suspicion towards different approaches of the recent past.  
Immediately after 1989 it was by all means for the extremist and ultra-
nationalist parties to include on their anti-democratic agenda, along side anti-
Semitism, xenophobia, and Holocaust denial, the rehabilitation of Romania’s 
wartime leader, Ion Antonescu. However, not only the extremists were to 
defend him, and uphold his personality and positive historical role.22 Sometimes 
even the moderates remained silent or expressed reluctance when it came to 
debate past genocide, and tended to minimalise the anti-Semitic policy of 
Antonescu.23 Concerned with the international image of the country some 
reiterated old clichés: “Antonescu was a savior of the monarchy and his 
country” (Ion Raţiu), “a defender of the Romanian nation and therefore a good 
Romanian” (Dan Amedeo Lăzărescu).24 Hard to classify such attitudes and say 
what exactly makes the difference between the extremists and the rest of 
Antonescu’s defenders.25 Moreover, what is sad and disturbing is that even after 
                                                          
20
  For a less pessimistic perspective see Dragoş Petrescu, “Can Democracy Work in 
Southeastern Europe? Ethnic Nationalism vs. Democratic Consolidation in Post-Communist 
Romania,” in Bálázs Trencsényi et. all eds., National Building and Contested Identities: 
Romanian & Hungarian Case Studies, Budapest, Iaşi, Regio Books, Polirom, 2001.
  
21
  
See Vladimir Tismăneanu, The Revolutions of 1989, Between past and Future, London, 
Routledge Press, 1999, p. 20.
 
22
  See Michael Shafir, "Marshal Antonescu's Post-Communist Rehabilitation: Cui Bono?", in 
Randolph L. Brahan ed., The Destruction of Romanian and Ukrainian Jews During the Antonescu Era, 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, p. 364.  
23
  
See Wiliam Totok, “Discursul Revizionist” [The Revisionist Discourse], Sfera Politicii, 
supplement, 1, September, 1998, pp. 26-27. 
24
  Ibid., pp. 26-27. 
25
  For Michael Shafir the difference consist in the role attributed to Antonescu's figure. The 
moderates regard the Marshal as a mean. On contrary, for the extremists, he is first of all a 
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2000 articles published in democratic newspapers continue to defend and justify 
Antonescu’s policy.26 At the same time, no wonder that in 2001, the results of an 
electronic pool made by a central daily indicates that only 24,55% of the Romanians 
who answered the questionnaire consider that Antonescu is a war criminal. 27 
Vladimir Tismăneanu defined the rehabilitation of Ion Antonescu in the 
early 1990s as “a shocking example of historic amorality and lack of political 
tact.”28 If one looks at the post-communist legitimization process, and the 
struggle for political space and power between the “successors” of the 
Romanian Communist Party and the traditional parties, one might understand 
who desperately needed Antonescu as a historical referent.  
In April 1992, during Easter, Mihai I paid, after a long absence, his first 
visit to Romania. The unexpected positive response of the population frightened 
the government, as several hundred thousands, of whom many were just curious 
and others rather anti-communist than monarchists, gathered in Bucharest to 
welcome him. First of all because the presence of the king weakened the image 
of president Iliescu and his party, the National Salvation Front, as Saviors of 
the country. Some Romanians were looking for another Savior “The Monarchy 
saves Romania” was the new slogan of the anti-communist and anti-Iliescu 
opposition for the next years, and rejected the national consensus proposed by 
the government.29 The response of the authorities was bitter, rude, and stupid. 
The king was forbidden access into Romania for several years. Moreover, 
Antonescu, the Savior of the 1940s30 was immediately brought on stage as a 
counterbalance symbol, and presented as a martyr, betrayed, together with his 
country, by the collaborationist king, decorated by the Soviets.31 On a short term 
this strategy proved successful, anyway more successful than the attempts to 
reinforce after 1989 the invented republican tradition.32 Yet, on a long term, it 
had terrible consequences. It affected the international image of Romania, 
                                                                                                                                              
'legitimization model,” and a purpose, namely the liquidation of Romania’s nascent democracy. 
See Michael Shafir, "Marshal Antonescu's Post-Communist Rehabilitation: Cui Bono?" p. 364.
 
26
  Valeriu Graur, “Războiul dezrobirii,” [The Liberating War], in Aldine, no. 272/2001, 
supplement of România liberă, 30 June 2001.
 
27
  See the electronic pool „A fost Mareşalul Antonescu un «criminal de război»?“ [Was 
Marshal Antonescu a “War Criminal”?] Ziua, 24/25, June 2001.
 
28
  Vladimir TismăneanuI, Fantasies of Salvation, p. 72.
 
29
  Mihai Chioveanu, “Monarhi şi « Salvatori »” [Kings and “Saviors”]. Sfera Politicii, 
81/2000, pp. 19-20.
 
30
  Antonescu presented himself as a Savior of Romania from the corrupt regime of Carol II 
in 1940, Iron Guard’s terrorist violence, and as an anti-Soviet hero and re-unifier of Greater 
Romania in 1941. See Sorin Alexandrescu, Paradoxul Român [The Romania Paradox], Bucharest, 
Univers, 1998, pp. 140-193.
  
31
  Lucian Boia, Istorie şi mit în conştiinţa românească [History and Myth in Romanian 
Consciousness] Bucharest: Humanitas, 1997, pp. 276-277.
 
32
  See Ioan Scurtu, Monarhia în România [The History of Romanian Monarchy], Bucharest, 
Danubius, 1991.
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nonetheless it polarized the Romanian society, encouraged the extremists to 
promote their anti-democratic agenda, distorted memory, and so on. 
This is not to say that president Iliescu, definitely an anti-fascist, and 
FSN, striving for power, are the initiators of Antonescu’s cult. For them 
Antonescu did not necessarily represent a model. However, their “utilitarian” 
and cheap Machiavellian approach was to bring them close, and strengthen the 
relations with the emerging organized extremism, which they often underestimated 
and thought they could control. When they realized the mistake they have done it 
was already too late.33 România Mare, Europa, and Gazeta de Vest were already 
popular publications. Soon, they were to accuse even Iliescu, who hesitated to 
officially rehabilitate Antonescu, of being manipulated by the Jews and the West.  
Post-communist attempts to rehabilitate Antonescu and his regime, and 
impose his cult have a too long and unpleasant history. A history that includes 
official commemorations by the Romanian parliament (1991, 1997, 1999), 
statues and memorials raised in several cities all over Romania, documentary 
and artistic movies (Oglinda, directed by Sergiu Nicolaescu in 1994), as well as 
protests, both from within Romania and international (US Congress in 1991, US 
State Department in 1993, The Anti-Defamation League, US Senators Denise 
Deconcini in 1995, Alphonse D’Amato and Cristopher Smith in 1997). Some of 
the cultish initiatives belonged to war veterans associations (the statues raised in 
1993 in Târgu Mureş Piatra Neamţ, and in 1995 in Bacău). Others were local 
initiatives that often had the support of the authorities representing the 
government or other state institutions (the statues raised in Slobozia and Lugoj). 
Last but not least, the state sponsored, from public funds, National Television 
and Radio broadcasting; army high-rank officers (General Mircea Chelaru and 
several others military historians such as Colonel Alesandru Duţu), Romania’s 
general attorney (Vasile Manea Drăgulin in 1993, and Sorin Moisescu in 1996-
1997), and several central dailies (Adevărul, Jurnalul Naţional) took part in the 
effort. From this perspective it seems that the extremists were only the most 
radical and most stubborn, nonetheless extremely and constantly noisy and 
visible but not unique, and definitely not alone.  
Paradoxically, at the same time the Romanian government promised 
several times to ban extremist political parties and publications, hate-speech, 
anti-Semitism, Antonescu’s cult, and the denial of Holocaust. Romania’s 
presidents, Ion Iliescu and Emil Constantinescu, took similar stands on the 
occasion of the commemoration of the pogrom in Iaşi, at the inauguration of, or 
while visiting the Holocaust Museum in Washington. However, they were to 
remain un-successful in their endeavors. No official, public, and explicit 
denunciation of Antonescu and past genocide has been recorded before 2001. A 
                                                          
33
  For the 1992 pro-governmental, anti-monarchic and pro-Antonescu, irresponsible media 
campaign see Vladimir Tismăneanu, Reinventarea Politicului. Europa de Est de la Stalin la Havel 
[Reinventing Politics. Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel], Iaşi, Polirom, 1998, p. 217. 
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lack of political and prosecutorial will, backed by a permanent, often 
unjustified, fear of a possible loose of popularity might explain such stands. 
Unfortunately, few took into consideration the costs for the twelve years of 
political stuttering, unfulfilled promises, and defiances.  
Though not the only and most probably not the most urgent problem 
Romania had to solve in the long preparatory process of integration in NATO 
and the European Union, the issue of Antonescu’s cult had a significant 
negative impact on Romania’s international image, and credibility. The West 
did not want to accept Romania’s entrance in its political and military structures 
with “Antonescu on the flag.” For them, any attempt to rehabilitate Antonescu, 
and the denial of Holocaust, were but symptom of a weak democratic society. 
Nonetheless, the more obstinate the Romanians were in their reluctance to solve 
this legal and moral problem, the more pessimistic the westerners with regard 
Romania’s chances to become a viable partner. 
Ordinary Romanians might have not understood the incompatibility 
between NATO and EU on one hand and Antonescu and the dictatorial past he 
personifies on the other hand. Not the same think is to be said about the 
politicians who, due to the permanent Western pressure, particularly in 
connection with NATO and EU entry requirements, gradually “abandoned” 
him. Meaning that, at least, they changed their discourse about the Marshal.34 
Many things changed radically in Romanian politics after 1996, and the 
2000 elections, at least at the surface. One could only with difficulties recognize 
in Ion Iliescu the neo-communist politician from the early 1990s. His amiable 
attitude toward Mihai I, and firm disagreement with Vadim Tudor, the extremist 
“ally” from 1992-1994, are illustrative in this sense. Did the president, and the 
Social Democrat Party, finally understood the message of the West? Did he 
realized after the 2000 elections, when Vadim Tudor managed to come on the 
second position, and his party took 21% of the votes, the real danger 
represented by political extremism? Most probably yes, as long as he kept the 
promises he made to the West, and the Romanians, who credited him with a 
comfortable majority of votes just to eliminate the peril and shame named 
“Greater Romania Party.” 
In October 2001, during his official visit in USA, after several meetings 
with members of the US Congress, and representatives of the Jewish 
community, the Romanian Prime Minister, Adrian Năstase, promised that the 
Romanian government would ban Holocaust denial, and the cult of war 
criminals. Five months later, in March 2002, during a seminar organized by the 
Holocaust Museum together with the Romanian Ministry of Defense, several 
Romanian officials publicly reaffirmed the responsibility of Antonescu’s 
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government, and of the Romanian army, for participating in the Holocaust. On 
the same occasion they stated the intention of the government to prohibit, by 
legal means, in the future, any organization, publication, and symbol of a 
fascist, racist and xenophobe type, and prosecute the denial of Holocaust in 
public. At stake was Romania’s entrance in normality once the state institutions 
will say a “farewell” to anti-democratic ideologies and symbols. Not fortuitous, 
the Ministry of Defense was the first institution to take this step. The army 
wanted to demonstrate once more that it made its “home work,” and prepared 
for the 2002 Prague Summit. And that the officers, the army elite, will no longer 
deny past responsibility, and never play a role in the rehabilitation of 
Antonescu, as they often did after 1989. 
Soon after, the government elaborated a low stipulating the removal of 
statues and other monuments raised in honor of war criminals and individuals 
responsible for crimes against peace and humanity.35 Streets, public squares, 
and parks could not be named after such persons. Moreover, fascist and racist 
organizations, publications, and symbols were forbidden. The cult of fascist 
leaders was also proscribed. Past trials and sentences against persons condemned by 
an international court for war crimes and crimes against humanity could not be 
contested, rejected, and denied. Likewise, specific penalties were included this 
time. Very general but not ambiguous, the low was meant to eliminate 
confusion and underline Bucharest’s new political attitude toward Antonescu 
and his cult. However, no specific references to his person were made. 
The new low was not welcomed by all, generated debates, and bitter 
responses. The liberals proposed a similar low in the case of communism, and 
considered that fascism and communism have to be condemned altogether. 
Other members of the parliament, even SDP senators, opposed it. For example 
Adrian Păunescu protested against those who described the Marshall as a war 
criminal, requested a new trial, denied Antonescu’s anti-Semitic policy and 
Romania’s responsibility for the Holocaust. "No government can establish what 
only experts are entitled to do… and… historic matters are the competence of 
historians."36 Naturally, Greater Romania Party and its leader had, again, the 
sourest reaction. Vadim Tudor said, “the law is irresponsible and stupid,” and 
called Prime Minister Năstase “a communist apparatchik, lacking historical 
culture and patriotic feelings.” The rest was to come: "someone is interested in 
portraying the Romanians as a nation of criminals …they want to kill Marshall 
Ion Antonescu once more." On 31st of May members of the “Greater Romania 
Party,” together with the “Pro-Antonescu League,” celebrated 120 years from 
the dictator’s birth, and 56 years from his execution. They even un-covered the 
bust of Antonescu in front of "Sfinţii Împăraţi Constantin şi Elena" church in 
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Bucharest.37 In Cluj, Mayor Gheorghe Funar, vice-president of the “Greater 
Romania Party,” who fanatically admires Antonescu for his anti-Hungarian 
stands, declared that he will continue to honor the dictator, preserve the name of 
the boulevard “Ion Antonescu,” and even raise a huge statue in his memory. 
Finally, media took part in the debate. Some saluted the initiative; others 
considered it exaggerated, and a result of international pressure. Not few, 
described it as a result of the new political pragmatism of the government, but 
remained largely skeptical toward the determination of the authorities to enforce 
the law, and the sudden, overnight “democratization” of the Romanian political 
class.38 And, to a certain extend, they proved right. Things did not go smoothly 
at all. The Prime Minister had to justify the decision to his subordinates. In 
some cases, mayors refused to remove Antonescu’s statues, and change the 
name of streets. However this was not the main problem as long as in many 
cases the prefects, sometimes backed by the police finally imposed the will of 
the government.39 What was of a real concern was that though many consider 
the law as necessary, and agree that fascist symbols have to be removed, and 
anti-Semitism banned, they also believed that Antonescu was a patriot. 
Meanwhile, synagogues were devastated in Vatra Dornei and Fălticeni, 
swastika was drawn on the walls of the Jewish theatre in Bucharest, several 
extremist publications continued to mushroom.40  
Romanians have problems with history. They do not know it. At the same 
time they also have problems with memory. Theirs is extremely selective, and 
distorted. A combination of the two makes many accept the icon of Antonescu 
as a liberator of Romanian territories, a patriot, a shield against Germany, and a 
sword against Soviet Union. They do not realize the negative impact of 
Antonescu’s rule on Romania, and their own lives. At the same time they do not 
want to remember his anti-Semitic policy, and do not want to accept, and debate 
the Romanian Holocaust. If they do, the main concern is to look for 
circumstantial evidences, aimed to help them contextualize “the deeds” of the 
Marshall, to explain, and sometimes even justify them. The final result was, 
sometimes still is, but a tendentious transformation of Antonescu into a symbol 
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of national dignity, “a dictator much less evil than Hitler,” even “a savior of the 
Romanian Jewry.” Some forgot, others obliterate the fact that Antonescu 
transformed a political and military conflict into an ethnic struggle, accepted to 
play the role of a supreme arbiter, shaped the fate of the Jews by his own will, 
and, one way or the other, helped Hitler make Europe Judenfrei.41  
Romanians do not have the memory of the Holocaust. They never had it, and 
were never encouraged to keep it.42 They do not have even the memory of the war. 
Trauma, the main trigger of memory, is missing in their case, as the Romanians did 
not suffer like, for example, the Poles did. The elders do not remember anything 
except the tragic episode from 1940, the heroic one from 1941, two or three 
bombardments, the shortage of food, the death of the beloved, mainly soldiers, not 
civilians. Some remember 23rd of August 1944 but they generally link the event to 
the memory of communism, and often prefer not to recall it. The post-war 
generations remember even less. As their elders were forced to “remain silent,” the 
youngsters’ only connection with the past consists in the extremely ritualized, 
official, and ideologically bound triumphalist histories, movies, and museums. 
All they have is an “ersatz of memory,”43 fictions and artifacts describing the 
anti-fascist military campaign of the Romanian army after 1944. Thus, when it 
comes to collective memory, a politically and socially sanctioned, official, 
massacred, extremely severed and mythologized version of the past represents the 
only legacy of the communist period. Moreover, after 1989, the total demise of the 
state as the “main choreographer” of memory was somewhat to worse things. When 
it comes to history and historical knowledge the situation is very much the same.  
On the 28th of June 2002, the Romanian Academy, together with the Ministry 
of Culture, organized a special session on the issue of Holocaust in Romania. In the 
opening, Eugen Simion, the president of the academy, underlined the necessity of 
“assuming the past… as to …avoid tragedies in the future.” Răzvan Teodorescu, 
the minister of culture, focused on the exigency to implement Low 31/2002, and the 
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“necessity of memory refreshness with every generation.” However, the academy 
effort and strive for consensus led nowhere. Only with difficulties historians 
gathered at the session came to conclude that Romania took part in the Holocaust, at 
the same time underlining the fact that there was no Holocaust in Romania, and 
finally characterized Antonescu as a “tragic figure”. Some of the historians did 
nothing else but to abandon their previous pro-Antonescu attitude while insisting on 
themes and mythologies that no longer makes the interest of scholars in western 
academia.44 Nevertheless, what was not clear was the final purpose of the session. 
Did the academy wanted to back the political effort of the government? Was a new, 
unique, and acceptable truth about the past, and a comprehensive definition of the 
Holocaust, what the historians were trying to forge? If so, than one might say that 
they were from the very beginning to fail. 
Hard to state in few words what Romanian historians have to say on this 
extremely sensitive topic.45 Some, like Gheorghe Buzatu, who consider that politicians 
should not interfere, and claim that the low represents “a second execution of 
Antonescu,” are ultranationalists. Others, like Dinu C. Giurescu, who considers 
that Antonescu was “the man of his country and not the third man of the Axis,” 
are conservative.46 In some cases the pre-1989 intellectual and political pedigree 
of the historian, in other cases his present institutional and political affiliation, 
might explain why some accepted to play the role of Antonescu’s “memorians.” In 
other cases it might not, as many historians ended trapped by the pro-Antonescu 
manipulation propaganda though they tried to stay away.  
Over the past decade and a half many Romanian historians were perceived, in 
block, as apologists of Antonescu, nationalists, revisionists, even negationists. Some 
of them were. Others were not. Not few have tried after 1989 to rehabilitate the 
dictator, though not all transformed this rehabilitation in a personal, or party, 
political task. What might have left this impression is the fact that many operated, 
sometimes as professionals, sometimes as opinion makers, with long term grounded 
mythologies when they described Antonescu as an honest man, a patriot, an 
anti-communist champion, and a savior of his country. Nonetheless, many tended to 
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retrieve the positive side of the Marshall, even when they did not deny the genocide, 
the deportations, his political and military huge errors, with tragic consequences for 
Romania, and even when they expressly underlined that Antonescu, an anti-liberal 
and an anti-democrat, can not represent a political model for 2001 Romania.47 
Historians are by definition less heretical than others. They always believe 
that they represent an authority and keep a pivotal position, and that their professional 
duty is to provide knowledge, and not to recall the past. Concerned with their 
academic prestige, many prefer a peculiar precocious stand when they have to 
come to terms with historically sensitive issues. Sometimes they succeed in their 
efforts. Sometimes they do not. However, their disagreement with the others is 
not always and not necessarily politically and ideologically grounded. It can be 
methodological, and terminological, as well. Non-Popperians less interested in 
present day practical issues and the decisions society has to face, they prefer to 
limit their “Plea” to historicization, even when the subject is existentially involved 
in the nexus between past and future. The present immediacy of the past bothers 
them, especially when it involves forms of moral condemnation. What they fear 
for most is that the latest might act as a blockade to knowledge. Not rarely that is to 
explain why historians do not want to accept and operate with memory, and prefer 
more vigorous, classic categories such as power, ideology, and state interest.48 
After 1989, in the absence of ancillae ideologiae, pressed by the public 
opinion – Where are the historians?, many Romanian historians started to recover 
and re-evaluate the pre-communist past. Struggling over it, obsessed with the idea 
of truth and objectivity, guided by methodological rationality, they disregarded 
the present and future implication of their treatment and representation of the past. 
What they refused to admit was a political and didactic approach, the ties between 
the past and the post-1989 democratization process, the way Romanian society 
was to (re) define citizenship, national identity, and so on. Problems only begin 
when the others protested, and remembered them about the pogroms, “death 
trains,” deportations, and the concentration camps in Transnistria. “Let the Past 
pass away!” some of the historians than shout. Others invoked a “grace of a latest 
birth.” Not few denied, or restricted as much as possible the responsibility of 
Antonescu, his regime, of the Romanian army, and Romanian civil population for 
the genocide. Nonetheless they tried to limit as much as possible the number of 
victims.49 Unprepared to relinquish all the internal resistance they felt against the 
full magnitude of the nameless atrocities committed by Antonescu’s regime and 
the Romanian army, historians prefered to approach, explain in context, and 
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define the genocide as part of the war, a tragic episode, an error.50 Tragically, they 
did not realized that this way they only came to cross the conventional limits of 
representation of the “unthinkable” and “unspeakable,” push toward trivialization, 
and often end by accepting the “Iron Times, Iron Brooms”51 logic and 
terminology of the perpetrators, justify and excuse their deeds.  
Historians might continue to consider Antonescu as “a savior of the Jews” 
and stress that what is “essential is that by the end of the war Romanian Jews 
were still alive.”52 They might continue to quote Fildermann, insist that 
Romanians refused to handle the Jews to Hitler’s henchmen, that they did not 
took part in the implementation of the Final Solution, on contrary helped the 
Jews fled to Palestine. They might also continue to look for individual 
responsibility, refuse symbolic collective guilt, reject global, conventional 
terminology, and prefer a more neutral one: ethnic cleansing, deportation, and 
pogrom.53 What is sad is that all above are indicative for the, generally 
speaking, incapacity of the Romanian historians to morn, at least historically.  
In March 2004 Romania joined NATO. In 2007, it joined the European 
Union. Thus, politics continued to play a significant role in eliminating the 
“phantom menace,” and people’s nostalgia for the heroic, mythologized 
history.54 May be, in time, this will help the society to come to terms with the 
“Ugly Past.” The next generations, released of frustrations, and in the absence 
of the sentiment of being “excluded,” will be less selective in their memory, and 
understand what their elders refused to accept. That memory is not only about 
“than” but also about “now” and “here.”55 Dominick LaCapra “The quest for a positive 
identity or for normalization through denial provides only illusory meaning and 
does not further the emergence of an acceptable future. A reckoning with the 
past in keeping with democratic values require the ability – or at least the 
attempt – to read scars and to affirm only what deserves affirmation as one turns 
the lamp of critical reflection on oneself and one’s own”. 
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